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Modem philosophers interested in the moral status of 
animals frequently debate the possibility of extending 
justice to animals througb a theory of social contract, 
witb Rawl's theory usually providing the basis of 
discussion. Contractualism was, of course, also an 
interest of ancient pbilosopbers, particularly tbe 
Epicureans, wbo believed that "pleasure," dermed as 
"freedom from anxiety," was the summum bonum and 
that this "pleasure" was dependent, in part, on human 
willingness to form contracts with one another. In this 
paper, I will propose that the Roman poet/pbilosopber 
Lucretius develops an ethical theory that "pleasure" is 
also achieved by forming contracts with some non-
buman species and by physically separating ourselves 
from other species. I will then examine a passage in the 
De Rerum Natura where Lucretius demonstrates that 
bumans cause anxiety and distress for themselves wben 
they violate these arrangements. 
Lucretius is often dismissed by philosopbers as 
simply the didactic poet whose contributions to the 
western pbilosophic tradition lie not in any originality 
of thought, but rather in his ability to make the teacbings 
of the Garden accessible to a wider audience than the 
attract. And indeed there can be no question about 
Lucretius' skillfulness in "boney-coating" the medicine 
of the pbilosopby of materialism.1 His use of exempla 
drawn from the natural world continues even today to 
delight, to instruct, and to seduce his readers into an 
understanding of difficult theories. For instance, the 
verbal image of fleecy sheep grazing on a far-off 
billside (2.317-322) makes readily comprebensible the 
concept of the invisibility of the individual moving 
atom. In his use of such exempla from the natural world, 
Lucretius is, of course, doing more than simply making 
palatable the principles ofEpicurean physics by offering 
familiar situations as proofs for the scientific arguments; 
be is also implicitly instructing bis readers in the 
methodology of Epicurean logic by encouraging them, 
first, to accept the validity of sense perception as the 
basis for exploring our universe and, second, to abstract 
from the perceived world to the unperceived world. In 
tbe didacticism of Lucretius, philosophic and poetic 
purposes converge, and the union is so seamless that 
we cannot justly evaluate tbe originality of bis 
contributions to tbe pbilosophic tradition witbout 
analyzing the literary aspects of the poem. Lucretius' 
presentation ofEpicurean ethics is especially dependent 
on a complex interweaving of poetic elements, such as 
recurring images, metapbors and verbal motifs. Of 
particular interest to philosophers tracing the bistory of 
buman thought about our relationsbips with other 
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species are the many descriptions ofanimals. Although 
at first glance these passages may appear to be 
"honey-coating," that is, literary embellishments to 
the philosophical arguments, or even digressions 
interrupting the philosophical arguments, in fact they 
serve to enrich and expand our comprehension of 
Lucretius' fundamental ethical thesis: that true 
happiness can be achieved only by freeing oneself from 
mental disturbance. 
In Book 5 ofDe Rerum Natura, Lucretius discusses 
the creation of our world from the eternal movement of 
indestructible atoms. In the final third of this book 
(5.925-1457), he concentrates his attention on the 
development of human society and culture, and here 
we find his most extended account of humankind's 
changing interactions with other animals. At 5.925 ff., 
Lucretius informs us that the earliest humans were tough 
and solitary individuals who "lived out their lives in 
the manner of roving wild animals" (5.932). They used 
neither fire nor clothing, they were satisfied with food 
gained by hunting and foraging, and they were content 
with bushes and caves for shelter. "When night overtook 
them, they placed their rough, naked limbs on the 
ground, like bristly wild pigs, wrapping themselves up 
in leaves and branches" (5.969-971). Primeval humans 
were both hunters and hunted, sometimes, by their 
deaths, providing food for other species (5.990-991). 
These beast-like humans obviously lacked the 
material comforts and physical protections of civilized 
society, but they also lacked its anxieties. Throughout 
the poem, Lucretius expresses concern that people of 
his own period were tortured by situations of their own 
making, such as war, where we manufacture death for 
our own species. Primitive humans endured no such 
self-created afflictions. They lived isolated from one 
another and did not engage in activities where "many 
thousands of men, following military banners, are led 
to death in a single day" (5.999-1000). Primitive man's 
worries were restricted to injury and death caused by 
natural forces, in particular an attack from another 
species. Primeval existence was not, ofcourse, a Golden 
Age of tranquillity. Attacks by boars and lions caused 
agonizing deaths for humans: "Tom by the animal's 
teeth, he would fill the mountains and forests with his 
shrieks as he watched his own living flesh buried in a 
living tomb" (5.991-993). Lucretius presents a 
description of human life at its most bestial stage in 
order to establish a point of contrast, first, with the 
technologically advanced, but anxiety-ridden life ofhis 
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own period, and, second, with the tranquil existence 
which humans enjoy if they understand the nature of 
their relationships to other species. 
A little earlier in Book 5, at 855 ff., in his discussion 
of the origins of animal life, Lucretius states that the 
species still existing at his time were those which had 
adapted well to their situations. Wild species survive 
because they are endowed with particular qualities 
which provide them with protection; for example, they 
are savage, like lions, cunning, like foxes, or swift, like 
deer (5.862-863).2 Other species, perhaps less well-
endowed, such as sheep, cattle, horses, and dogs, sought 
the protection of humans, and, in a mutually beneficial 
arrangement, they provide us with meat, dairy products, 
wool or labor in return for readily-available food and 
safety from predators. In his account of this process, 
Lucretius has stated a theory recently iterated by 
Stephen Budiansky: that domestication is a natural 
occurrence and that some species choose to move in 
and cooperate with one another.3 As Lucretius describes 
the process, humans did not forcibly create barnyards; 
rather, certain species entrusted themselves to our 
custody or guardianship (tutela, 5.861 and 867)4 and we 
accepted the responsibility because of their usefulness 
to us (utilitas, 5.860,870, 873).5 These domestic species 
have formed with us what Desmond Morris calls "the 
animal contract," a tacit understanding that cooperation 
between the species would be mutually expedient.6 For 
each species, the contract offered securitas, "freedom 
from anxiety," and thus Epicurean "pleasure."7 The 
contract permitted the development ofagriculture which, 
in turn, moved humankind from a brutish existence to 
the prosperity and safety of a human community. The 
progress of our civilization has therefore depended on 
the willingness of other species to choose domestication 
and to enter into alliances with us. The benefits to 
humankind are enormous, but the benefits to the other 
species are dependent on human willingness to fulfill 
our part of the "animal contract," our tacit agreement 
to provide security for them even as they offer us the 
security of a stable food supply. Our promise of security 
is not a promise of a long life, but of a "secure," 
anxiety-free life. At 2.875-880, Lucretius describes the 
"food chain." Lush pastures are transformed into cattle, 
which we eat and thus transform into human bodies, 
which, in turn, sometimes provide food for wild animals 
or scavenging birds. Lucretius accepts the use of herd 
animals for human food as a natural pattern, but 
nonetheless believes that we owe them, as well as 
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working dogs and horses, security from hunger, thirst 
and predators. In exchange for their products and 
services, we have agreed to free them from fear. 
The relevance of 5.855-877 to Epicurean theories 
ofjustice is significant. Epicurus taught that justice was 
an agreement among humans not to harm or be harmed.s 
He did not consider it a natural element of the human 
character or a transcendent norm, but rather a prudent 
invention to provide that security, or freedom from 
disturbance, which constituted true pleasure and which 
was impossible when human beings preyed on one 
another. Justice was thus rigidly subordinated to 
demands of personal security and would have no 
existence if security could be acquired without it. 
Epicurus believed that animals (and some humans) were 
incapable of making agreements not to harm or be 
harmed and therefore of being included under 
definitions ofjustice or injustice.9 Epicurus' successor, 
Hermarchus, elaborated on this aspect of Epicurus' 
theory of justice by remarking that it would have been 
advantageous for humans to extend justice to other 
animals by participating in contracts with them in order 
to increase our own security, but such contracts were 
impossible because animals do not possess reason. 10 
Yet despite the apparent denial of "animal contracts" 
by Epicurus and Hermarchus, in 5.860 ff. ofLucretius' 
poem, we read about a pattern of contract formation 
between humans and animals which resembles the 
human-human contracts described by Epicurus, and by 
Lucretius at 5.1019-1020, in the sense that the impulse 
for cooperation was a calculation of expediency. The 
sheep, cattle, horses, and dogs of 5.860 ff. empirically 
determined that existence within a human society was 
more secure than existence without, even as the humans 
of 5.1011 ff. empirically determined, first, that family 
life and, then, that community life defined by a mutual 
covenant of non-aggression11 provided a better chance 
for survival of both the individual and the species than 
the isolated existence of the earliest humanS.12 There 
are, of course, important differences between the 
human-human and human-animal contracts described 
by Lucretius. The human-human covenants of 5.1019-
1020, which laid the foundation for social life, were 
mutual non-aggression pacts among men of similar 
capabilities not to harm one another or the weaker 
members of the community. If the lions and boars of 
5.862 and 985 had formed covenants with humans, the 
terms would have been similar. 13 The human-animal 
contracts of5.864-870, however, were tacit agreements 
to swap goods and services: food and protection from 
predators in exchange for meat, milk, wool, and labor, 
tutela for utilitas. Humans are portrayed as the stronger 
party in the agreement because they can serve as 
protectors, but quite clearly they assume that an 
agreement exists, that it involves a swap, and that they 
can expect a return for their efforts. The basis of the 
agreement for both parties is the anticipation ofbenefits. 
Thus, ifLucretius is stating, as I think he is, that certain 
species did in fact fmm tacit contracts with humans 
and that these contracts were motivated by a desire for 
security on each side, then any violation of the contract 
and failure on the human side to provide security would 
constitute unjust treatment. 
For Lucretius, the utility of animals to humans lies 
in their participation in a broad range ofactivities which 
assure a regular and ample food supply. And, although 
the dogs and horses may sometimes have assisted in 
hunting expeditions, for the most part, these activities 
fall under the category of agriculture. Lucretius does 
not provide a relative chronology for the origins of 
human covenants with other humans and with other 
animals, both of which led to stable and prosperous 
agricultural communities, but presumably he believed 
that the developments were parallel occurrences, each 
affecting the success of the other. Moreover, he surely 
considered these developments to be positive because 
a dependable food supply would foster the desired peace 
of mind, the Epicurean "pleasure."14 Indeed, the 
emphasis in Lucretius' description of the discovery of 
plant cultivation (5.1361-78) is on the pleasure produced 
by the mere sight of carefully ordered croplands and 
orchards, a sight which bears witness to humankind's 
empirically developed ability to make plants produce 
food in abundance. In this description of humankind's 
successes as a cultivator, it is Lucretius' poetic devices, 
particularly his choice and placement of words, which 
impart the ethical message that there is pleasure and 
therefore "good" in encouraging fruitfulness. The 
farmland is "delightful" (dulcis, 1367), the grain fields 
and vineyards are "luxuriant" (laeta, 1372) and the 
orchards are "fruitful" (jelicibus, 1378). 
Here we are reminded of the opening of the poem, 
the invocation to Venus, who is an allegory both for the 
fertility of creative nature and for the pleasure which 
this fertility brings: "0 nurturing Venus, pleasure of 
men and gods" (hominum divumque voluptas/alma 
Venus, 1.1 and 2). The advent of Venus brings light and 
life, fragrant flowers, green meadows and "luxuriant 
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pastures" (pabula laeta, 1.15) in which domesticated 
herds frolic. Lucretius urges Venus to lull to rest Mars, 
an allegory of war, destruction and death. IS Thus, at 
the very beginning of his poem, Lucretius establishes a 
dichotomy: creation/pleasure vs. destruction/anxiety. 16 
Poetic images instruct us that the human cultivation of 
plants and husbandry of animals is a participation in 
the creative processes ofnature (natura creatrix, 5.1362) 
and a source of true pleasure. Lucretius repeats several 
times in the poem the joyful image of pastures and 
domesticated flocks which appears first in the 
invocation to Venus. At 1.257-261, for example, he 
describes herd animals, with their udders full of milk, 
resting in "luxuriant pastures" (pabula laeta, 257), while 
their young offspring play in the tender grass. The poetry 
seduces the reader by evoking recall ofa situation which 
is pleasurable: the sight of secure and fertile domestic 
animals. The logical function of this passage is to 
explicate a principle ofEpicurean physics: that nothing 
is ever reduced to nothing, but rather every compound 
eventually dissolves into atoms from which new 
compounds are created. 17 Yet this passage also 
reinforces an element ofEpicurean ethics by developing 
the poetic motif that domestication is a source of 
pleasure for humans. A similar duality of didactic 
purpose occurs at 2.317-322, a passage mentioned 
earlier in this paper. Here Lucretius uses an exemplum 
of sheep in "luxuriant pastures" (pabula laeta, 317) with 
their well-fed lambs to elucidate his comments about 
the invisibility of the movement of atoms, but again 
the poetic imagery underlines also the ethical point that 
domestication brings pleasure. Such images remind us 
that agriculture offers the security ofa dependable food 
supply and thus the pleasure of a secure mind. In 
contrast, the pre-agricultural humans described in 5.925 
ff., although free of self-imposed anxieties such as war 
and religion, were disturbed by concerns about the 
uncertainty of their food supply and about the dangers 
inherent in obtaining food. 
If we were to locate a Golden Age in Lucretius' 
narrative of human history, it would be a period when 
the development of communities provided a security 
unknown to primitiveindividuals, but where human 
inventiveness had not yet turned its attention to the 
manufacture of artificial terrors. Humankind's best 
opportunity for peace of mind is therefore an ideal 
agricultural community, an Epicurean Garden perhaps, 
where the regular and orderly rhythms of plant 
cultivation and animal husbandry protect inhabitants 
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from anxiety about physical necessities. In this Garden, 
security is maintained by cooperative efforts to repel 
''non-contract'' animals, like lions, boars, foxes and deer, 
which devour human food (or humans!) without 
offering compensation, while "contract" animals fulfIll 
their obligations to provide labor, food and wool. I8 
However Lucretius suggests that humans have at times 
failed to fulfill their part of the contract and he correlates 
human violations of the contract with our incorrect 
judgments about the sources of pleasure and happiness. 
Within his general outline of the development of 
human society in Book 5, Lucretius notes that man's 
earliest weapons were his own hands and teeth (man at 
his most beast-like), then tools such as stones and 
branches, and finally metal implements (5.1283-1286). 
He then reminds us, at 5.1289-1292, that copper and 
iron could be utilized for both agriculture and war. 19 
"With copper they worked the soil; with copper they 
stirred the billowing waves of war, and scattered 
devastating wounds. And they seized herds and fields. 
Everything else, naked and unarmed, readily fell prey 
to them, since they were armed." Here Lucretius uses 
metaphors to press his points. The Latin verb serere, 
translated by "scattered," denotes the process of sowing, 
as in sowing a field with seeds. In Lucretius, however, 
warriors sow wounds. In their actions, they are like 
farmers, but, in their results, quite the opposite: farmers 
scatter life, warriors scatter death. The contrast between 
agriculture and war continues: farmers protect herds 
and fields, warriors destroy them. And, with the 
technology for metal weapons, the armed warrior easily 
dominates all the unarmed creatures whose way of life 
his cave-dwelling ancestors once shared. 
For Lucretius, the invention of metal-working was 
a mixed blessing, allowing advancement in the life-giving 
activities ofagriculture, but also producing new ways of 
death. The topic of non-animate implements of war 
leads him to the topic of animate implements and, at 
5.1297, he begins a discussion about the employment 
of animals for warfare, claiming that the frrst animals 
which people took to the battlefield were horses, used 
as mounts for warriors and, later, as draught animals to 
pull chariots. Lucretius then notes, at 5.1302-1304, that 
the Carthaginians successfully "trained elephants to 
endure the agonies ofwar." Since that time, he observes, 
humankind's "woeful inability to cooperate has given 
birth to one invention after another" which terrifies 
human warriors and adds to the horrors of war, day in 
and day out. For example, Lucretius writes at 5.1308 
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ff., people tried to use bulls, boars and lions as animate 
implements of war. The experiments were unsuccessful 
because tbese animals could not be trained to be steady, 
obedient companions. Panic-stricken by tbe carnage of 
battle, tbe lions leapt at friend and foe alike, tbe bulls 
trampled tbeir trainers and tbe boars gored tbem witb 
tbeir tusks. The result of tbese experiments was utter 
chaos, as tbe animals attacked one anotber, screamed 
in pain and ran in frenzied disorder on tbe battlefield. It 
is important to notice tbat, in 5.1308-1310, Lucretius 
traces tbe development of empirically determined 
concepts by depicting a series of experiments which 
led up to tbe disastrous battle, experiments which 
progressed from using contract animals as mounts, to 
using contract animals as offensive weapons, and tben 
to using non-contract animals as offensive weapons: 
"Mter tbeir success witb horses and elephants, men tried 
(temptarunt) bulls in battle; and tbey tried (experti sunt) 
to send boars against tbe enemy; and some sent lions in 
the front rank."20 
The animals-in-warfare passage functions, however, 
as more tban a narrative element in the history ofhuman 
progress. It also serves in tbe development ofLucretius' 
theme that humans are responsible for much of tbeir 
own anxiety and, more particularly, tbat they themselves 
suffer when tbey violate tbe human-animal contract, 
abuse animals and ignore tbe patterns of nature. Witb 
tbe invention of metal implements which enabled 
humans to overpower everytbing that was naked and 
unarmed (5.1292), two courses of action were now 
possible: 1. creation of a Garden where several species 
interacted peacefully and metal was used botb for 
implements like ploughs pulled by contract animals, 
and also for weapons to protect tbe Garden from non-
contract animals, and 2. utilization of metal weapons 
to seize the herds and fields of others, thus inviting 
retaliatory violence and initiating an "arms race" in which 
ultimately botb contract and non-contract animals were 
employed as machines of war. The former course 
promotes creation and tberefore pleasure; the latter 
invites destruction and tberefore anxiety. Lucretius does 
not, however, explicitly recommend that we make a 
choice between antitbetical options; instead he guides 
us to the correct decision by expanding his presentation 
of tbe horrible consequences of devoting human 
inventiveness to metbods ofdestruction. The terrifying 
description oftbe battle scene in which several species, 
including humans, are killing and being killed in a 
hideous manner is Lucretius' culminating statement of 
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why war must be avoided. His poetic imagery instructs 
us as forcefully as any prose treatise on ethics could 
that human military ambitions destroy the orderly and 
peaceful rhytbms of tbe Garden, and simply return 
humans to the cave, to that level of primitivism from 
which, in other respects and with other inventions, they 
had advanced. It is particularly significant that Lucretius 
chose to depict not just humans in conflict with one 
another, but several species brought into indiscriminate 
combatbecause ofhuman failure to comprehend thebasis 
of true pleasure. Once again,references to human inter-
actions with otherspecies illuminateacentral ethical thesis. 
The adjective "savage" (saevus) is used three times 
in 5.1309-1314, once of the boars (sues saevos, 1309), 
once of the lions (leones saevi, 1310-1314), and once 
of the humans (saevis magistris, "savage handlers," 
1311). The repetition of the adjective draws togetber 
boars, lions, and humans as agents in a portrait of 
frenzied slaughter.21 The humans are also called "armed 
trainers" (doctoribus armatis) in 1311. The juxta-
position of the nouns magistri and doctores with the 
adjectives saevi and armati is jarring. The nouns 
magistri and doctores denote people who have acquired 
knowledge and have mastered skills, people who could 
use their knowledge and skills to lead others away from 
violence and warfare and toward increased security and 
pleasure.22 The greatest of teachers, Epicurus, 
developed a philosophy whose "delightful solaces 
soothed (permulcent) human minds" (5.21). But the 
teachers of5.1311 are "savage" and "armed," and spend 
their efforts on experiments which only intensify human 
anxieties. The movement away from tbe Garden is 
clearly defmed in this section of the poem. The "armed" 
trainers were unable to control tbe movements of tbe 
bulls, boars and lions, and tbe horsemen were unable 
to soothe (mulcere, 5.1317) the terrified spirits of the 
horses. This passage impresses upon us tbe insanity of 
forcing animals into situations unnatural to them. Our 
earliest war animals, tbe horses mentioned at 5.1297 
ff., had a contract with us: labor in return for food and 
protection from savage animals. Yet we violated the 
contract and put them on a battlefield with tbese same 
savage animals. Having ourselves regressed to savagery, 
we erased the boundaries between contract and 
non-contract animals which had permitted the 
expansion ofpeaceful and creative activities. The horses 
had entrusted themselves to our care because they 
wanted peace (5.868-869: pacem secuta sunt). They 
were willing to labor for us in exchange for security, 
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but we used their labor in warfare, where they were 
forced to endure pain, where their flanks and bellies 
were gored (5.1324). The bulls, another domesticated 
species and therefore "under contraet," were also forced 
into a situation where they became panic-stricken, and 
trampled their handlers underfoot and gored the horses. 
Even the animals which the human handlers had 
considered to be sufficiently trained at home became 
frenzied by the tumult, noise and pain of battle. Thus 
humankind. whose progress from primitivism could be 
marked by its ability to ease the fears of animals and 
then train them for agricultural use, became a "wilder" 
of beasts, forcing them back into situations from which 
their wild ancestors had originally sought the protection 
of humans. Clearly, the breach of contract, which the 
abuse of domestic animals implies, causes horrifying 
chaos and a clear regression from people's productive 
coexistence with other animals in the Garden. 
And what of the boars and lions? They had long 
threatened human life, and humankind had formed no 
contracts with them. Indeed people had deliberately kept 
their distance, avoiding the areas in which those animals 
lived and gathering into their Garden only those species 
with which they could form contracts. And yet. in order 
to enhance their military capabilities, people were 
willing to experiment with an unnatural alliance and to 
attempt to train randomly savage animals to be savage 
on command. The boars and lions, of course, would 
have no part of such an alliance. On the battlefield, they 
acted true to nature, attacking other species and the 
people who had brought them there. Thus humankind, 
by its arrogant and insane refusal to observe the patterns 
of nature, had ironically engineered its own destruction 
by those very same animals whose unexpected attacks 
humankind's earliest ancestors had tried to avoid. 
To sum up: through poetic imagery and thematic 
patterns, rather than through argument, Lucretius 
demonstrates that security-the Epicurean "pleasure"-
is best achieved by forming mutually-beneficial 
contracts with some species and by separating ourselves 
from other species. He also suggests that the abuse of 
animals in warfare indicates human ignorance or 
contempt for the patterns of nature and that, although 
motivated by our desire for security/pleasure, such 
abuse only increases human distress. 
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mentioned by Lucretius at 5.871-877 which became extinct 
because the were endowed with no natural asset which would 
enable them either to live in the wild, or to offer an utilitas 
which might persuade us to feed them and keep them safe 
(tutum, 5.874). In arguing his case for co-evolution, 
Budiansky, 125 notes that the species which chose 
domestication have been remarkably successful at survival. 
"In 1860, man and domestic species accounted for 5 percent 
of terrestrial biomass. Today the figure is approximately 20 
percent." (An animal protectionist might question whether 
we can use the term "successful" of species which live brief 
lives in factory conditions.) 
13 The fox and deer of 5.863 are in a different category. 
The threat they pose to humankind is not of aggression but of 
devouring our food supplies. The deer, moreover, are useful 
to us as food. Neither Lucretius nor Hermarchus provides an 
explicit distinction between predator and prey (wild animals) 
and between edible and inedible (domestic animals). 
14 5.958-961: The food supply of primitive humans was 
uncertain and they were not able to give consideration to the 
common good. Each individual carried off for himself 
whatever prize fortune brought him. 
15 The activities of Mars also preclude the tranquillity 
necessary for the creative work of philosophy in which 
Lucretius was engaged (1. 41 and 42). 
16 Charles Segal, Lucretius on Death and Anxiety 
(Princeton 1990) 208 ff., discusses the dialectic in Lucretius' 
poem between creation/destruction, life/death, peace/war, 
serenitylrestlessness, and philosophy/superstition. See also c.R. 
Beye, "Lucretius and Progress," Classical Journal 58 (1963). 
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17 1.263-264: "Nature fashions one object from another 
object and allows nothing to be born except with the assistance 
of the death of something else." Epicurus taught that 
destruction (death) was as natural a process as creation, and 
that the continual presence ofeach process served to maintain 
a balance in the universe. Lucretius describes the 
life-<leath-life cycle at 2.576-580: "blended with the funeral 
lament is the wail which infants raise when they first see the 
light of life. Never has any night following day or any dawn 
following night not heard the mournful laments of death 
mingled with a newborn's cries." Yet, although Lucretius 
might declare with scientific insistence that death was not to 
be feared, his poetic celebration oflife as pleasurable clearly 
indicates that his sympathies lie with creation. 
18 At 5.39-42, Lucretius asserts that wild animals, which 
had posed a major threat to primitive human existence, could 
in his day be easily avoided because they lived in inaccessible 
areas. His statement implies that he considered the boundaries 
between cultivated and uncultivated, domestic and wild, to 
be easily discernible. (See, however, footnote 13.) 
19 James Nichols, Epicurean Political Philosophy, 168 
ff., remarks that this passage underlines the troubling, yet 
necessary interconnections between progress in the arts and 
in warfare. Lucretius realized that human curiosity and desire 
for prosperity were responsible for inventions which promoted 
peace of mind (the philosophy of Epicurus being the greatest 
of these inventions), but that curiosity and desire also produced 
developments in destructive technology. Cf. 5.1430-1435, 
where Lucretius laments that humans fail to recognize that 
there must be a limit to acquisition. Mitsis, 91, remarks that 
Epicurean philosophy offers "compelling hedonistic reasons" 
for controlling our desires rationally. 
20 Asmis, Epicurus'Scientific Method (Ithaca, N.Y., 1984) 
58, comments on the animals-in-warfare passage that each 
discovery, from mounted horses to chariot horses to war 
elephants and then to bulls, lions, and boars, can be viewed as 
growing outofa previous one "by the application ofempirically 
formed concepts. As in all other crafts, the adaptation of a 
concept to a new situation results in new observations, which 
may then inspire further experimentation." 
21 De Grummond, "On the Interpretation of De Rerum 
Natura Y.1308-1349," Atene e Roma 26-27 (1981-82) 52, 
notes that saevus is a standing epithet for lions and boars in 
Lucretius, but is used directly of humans only here in the 
poem. He also notes that 9 of the 15 occurrences of saevus 
are in Book 5. 
22 The noun doctor is cognate with the verb docere, "to 
teach," "to train." Lucretius frequently uses the verb to 
describe his own activity of explicating Epicurean philosophy 
in Latin verse, i.e. 1.265,3.31,5.56. The noun magister often 
means "teacher." 
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